|
OPIM 403 MIS Seminar on Electronic MarketsFall 2003 |
| Professor: | Dr. Ravi Bapna |
| Class Time: | Friday 3-6 |
| Office: | 381 |
| Office Hrs. | Walk in any time |
| Email: | rbapna@sba.uconn.edu |
| Classroom: | OPIM Conference Room |
| WWW: | http://www.sba.uconn.edu/users/rbapna |
| Office Phone: | 860-486-8398 |
This seminar will cover research topics in the area of electronic markets. We will begin the semester in lecture mode, delving into Game Theory and classical Auction theory. Subsequently, we will study contemporary research in auction theory exploring a wide range of topics and methodologies. My objective is that at the end of the course you should be in a position to apply state-of-art market design techniques to interesting IS problems (in particular).
You will be judged on your class participation (40%), your tackling of the problem sets(10%), and on a research proposal (50%) that you will be asked to deliver and present at the end of the course. Success in the course will hinge critically on your ability to demonstrate creative and original thinking and on the "quality" of your class participation.
Textbook - Game Theory for Applied Economists, by R. Gibbons.
Links to Useful (Grad Student) Resources
| Topic | Author | File or link |
| How to present a research paper?
Since I agree with most of Matthew Jackson's suggestions I am requesting you to please follow these guidelines closely in the coming weeks. |
Matthew O. Jackson | http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~jacksonm/present.pdf |
| Choosing research problems | Alok Gupta | http://alok.csom.umn.edu/research_problems.htm |
| Ron Weber (MISQ Editor in Chief) | March 2003 Editorial - The Problem of the Problem | |
| Presenting results | David Levine | Presenting Results |
| Misc. | David Levine | David Levine's Cheap Advice |
Schedule of Topics (Tentative)
| Date | Topic | Details, notes, paper assignment |
| Game Theory Foundation | ||
| 8/29/03 | Introduction
Game theory |
Lecture 1, Gibbons Ch. 1 |
| 9/5/03 | Game theory | Lecture 2, Gibbons Ch, 2-4 |
| Classical Auction Theory | ||
| 9/12/03 | Revenue equivalence | Lecture 3
Wolfstetter, Auction Theory Chapter William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance, 16:8--37, 1961.[pdf] (Vickrey got the Nobel for this!) |
| 9/19/03 | Mechanism Design | Lecture 4
Jackson, M. Mechanism Theory. Forthcoming in Encyclopedia of Life Support Stystems. 2000 [pdf] Mechanism Design, Parkes, D., Chapter 2 in PhD dissertation, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency, Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, May 2001. |
| 9/26/03 | Optimal auctions | J. Bulow and J. Roberts,
"The
simple economics of optimal auctions," J. of Political
Economy, vol. 97, no. 5, Oct. 1989, pp. 1060-1090. (Sanjukta)
Pinker, Edieal J., Abraham Seidmann and Yaniv Vakrat, Using Transaction Data for the Design of Sequential, Multi-unit, Online Auctions, Univ. of Rochester working paper, 2001. (Bhavik) |
| Contemporary Auction Research | ||
| 10/3/03 | Multi-unit Auctions | Bapna, Ravi, Paulo Goes, and Alok Gupta,
"Analysis and Design of Business-to-Consumer Online
Auctions,” Management Science, January 2003. [PDF]
(Bartosz)
Myerson, R.B., "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1): 58-73, Feb. 1981. (Yanbin) |
| 10/10/03 | Simulation | Bapna, Ravi, Paulo Goes, and Alok Gupta,
"Replicating Online Yankee Auctions to Analyze Auctioneers' and
Bidders' Strategies," Sept. 2003, Information Systems
Research. [pdf] (Matthew)
Bapna, R., Paulo Goes, Alok Gupta, Gilbert Karuga, "Optimal Design of the Online Auction Channel: Analytical, Empirical and Computational Insights," forthcoming in Decision Sciences, 2002. [pdf] (Yong) Research proposal outline due. |
| 10/17/03 | Valuation estimation | Research
proposal discussion. Please prepare a 10 minute presentation that
outlines your proposed research questions.
Carare, O., "Need for Speed,
Estimation in multi-object auctions," UT Dallas working paper.
[pdf] (Rajeev) |
| 10/24/03 | Demand reduction
|
Cramton, P., and Ausubel, L. M., "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Working Paper, University of Maryland, July 2002. (Samir) John A. List and David Lucking-Reiley, "Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment." American Economic Review, September 2000, vol. 90, no. 4, pp. 961-972. [pdf] (Yanbin) |
| 10/31/03 | Bidding strategy | Roth, A.E. and Axel Ockenfels, Last
Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and
Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet working paper, May
2000, revised. (Bhavik)
Avery, C., Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 65, No. 2. (Apr., 1998), pp. 185-210. [pdf] (Yong) |
| 11/7/03 | Distributed computing | Chaki Ng,
David Parkes and Margo Seltzer. Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof
Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation. [pdf]
(Bartosz)
Chiranjeeb Buragohain, Divy Agrawal and Subhash Suri, A Game-Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems (Sanjukta) |
| 11/14/03 | Adverse selection | Dewan,
S., “Price Discovery in Generalist Versus Specialty Online Auctions”
Paper: Adverse
Selection in Reputations-Based Electronic Markets: Evidence from Online
Stamp Auctions, Working Paper, University of California, Irvine. (Matthew)
Research proposal discussion II. Please prepare a 10 minute presentation that shows your progress to date with the research paper. |
| 11/21/03 | Auctions and LP | Parkes, D., Linear Programming and Auction
Design, Chapter 4 in PhD
dissertation, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and
Computational Efficiency, Department of Computer and Information
Science, University of Pennsylvania, May 2001 [ch4.pdf]
(Rajeev)
S. Bikhchandani and J. Ostroy, "Ascending
Price Vickrey Auctions," |
| 11/28/03 | Thanksgiving break | |
| 12/5/03 | Presentations | In class 30 minutes each. |
| 12/10/03 | Final "term paper" research proposal due | |
| Papers we could not cover:
Predicting
Bidders’ Willingness to Pay in Online Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions:
Analytical and Empirical Insights George A. Akerlof, "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3. (Aug., 1970), pp. 488-500. [pdf] (Nesrin) |
||
Dated: 09/16/2005